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CASES NOTED

TERMINATE RATHER THAN INTEGRATE-A NEW STEP
TOWARDS LEGALIZED DISCRIMINATION IN
RECREATIONAL FACILITIES
Black residents of Jackson, Mississippi, sought to enjoin the city
from closing its five municipally operated swimming pools. Their complaint filed in the federal district court charged that the city, confronted
with a desegregation order, unlawfully shut down its pools rather than
integrate them.' Such action, the plaintiffs alleged, violated the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. The City of
Jackson contended that the pools were closed because it was not economically feasible to operate them on an integrated basis and that the
personal safety of its citizens would be endangered if the pools remained
open. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held for the defendants and refused to grant an injunction.2 This
decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en banc.' On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, in a five-four decision, held: The closing of municipally operated swimming pools to avoid integration violates neither the thirteenth
amendment nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Palmerv. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940 (1971).
The thrust of the petitioners' argument and the basis for the Court's
decision lies in the interpretation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 4 As Justice Black, writing for the majority, admitted, "[there can be no doubt that a major purpose of this Amendment was to safeguard Negroes against discriminatory state laws . .. ."

The initiative for applying the fourteenth amendment to segregated
public facilities was provided in the landmark decision of Brown v. Board
of Education.' The holding in Brown that "separate but equal" schools
were a denial of equal protection was soon expanded to include other
public facilities.
In Dawson v. Mayor and City Council,7 the Fourth Circuit held that
Brown's mandate applied to public beaches and bathhouses as well as to
schools. Dawson was summarily affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court' on the same day that the Court held that a public golf course
could not be operated on a segregated basis.' Numerous decisions followed which prohibited virtually all enforced segregation of public owned
1. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 627 (5th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
2. The district court opinion was not reported.
3. Palmer v. Thompson, 419 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1969).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 1942 (1971).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
7. 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Dawson].
8. Mayor and City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
9. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
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or operated facilities.1" The final blow to state and local governmental
efforts to stall the integration of recreational facilities came in 1963,
when the United States Supreme Court held that local governments had
the burden of proving extremely compelling circumstances for delays in
desegregation."
However, there have been only a few instances where courts have
dealt with the issue of whether recreational facilities could be closed
rather than integrated. One of the first decisions arose when a group of
Blacks brought an action to prohibit the City of Greensboro from selling
two previously segregated swimming pools. A federal district court in
North Carolina held that the city had a right to sell its pools and that
such action did not deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws.'
In another case, a city closed its parks while an action seeking to compel
the integration of the parks was pending. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
held that no state or federal law required the city to operate the parks;
therefore, closing the facilities did not violate the equal protection
clause. 8 The city officials had stated that there were "grave problems
involving.. . welfare and public safety... ," and that it was in the best
interests of the community to close the parks.14 The court concluded that
such decisions were better left to the "wisdom" of the city officials.
Thus, as the court commented, the plaintiffs' success in obtaining an integration order was a "Pyrhhic victory" since it came at the expense of
depriving everyone of the use of the parks.1 5
The petitioners in the instant case, nonetheless argued that the
closing of the Jackson swimming pools was in violation of their rights to
equal protection of the law. This argument was based on two points: (1)
the closings constituted illegal and impermissable discriminatory state
action, and (2) the decision to close the pools could not be justified by
reasons of economy or public safety. One of the Jackson city pools had
been leased from the local YMCA. After the city closed the pools, the
YMCA resumed operation of that pool on a "whites-only" basis.' 6 The
petitioners contended that the City of Jackson had in effect, participated
in and encouraged discrimination by private parties in the subsequent
operation of recreational facilities. Such action, the petitioners argued,
was illegal because it violated the equal protection clause.
This situation in Palmer was analagous to the one in Griffin v.
County School Board.17 There the public schools in Prince Edward
County were closed rather than integrated, and private schools for whites
10. For a summary of the history of recreational desegration, see the dissenting opinion
of Justice White in Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1952-68 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
11. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
12. Tonkins v. Greensboro, 162 F. Supp. 549 (M.D.N.C. 1958).
13. Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960).
14. Id. at 369.
15. Id. at 368-69.
16. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1944 n.8 (1971).
17. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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only were opened. Because of the various allowances and tax credits
allowed white private schools by the State of Virginia, the Supreme Court
held that this was a state scheme to promote segregation and thus a denial
of equal protection. Similarly, it has been held that when a private party
leases facilities from a state or city, any discrimination in the operation
of that facility will be considered discrimination by the state."8
The majority of the Court in Palmer distinguished Griffin because
there was no showing of state action in Palmer. Neither was there any
evidence indicating that the City of Jackson operated the swimming pool
in collusion with the YMCA. The Court stated that relief would be
granted only where the city actually operated the facilities through a
facade of private control.' 9
The instant petitioners also relied on the case of Reitman v.
Mulkey2 ° in an effort to establish that the City of Jackson had, in effect,
authorized private discrimination. In Reitman, the California Supreme
Court had invalidated a recently enacted state constitutional amendment 2 which effectively overruled two state statutes prohibiting private
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real estate.22 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the California court that the
challenged amendment encouraged racial discrimination so as to be
violative of the fourteenth amendment." The federal courts have also
stricken state statutes24 and denounced state and local policies25 which
effectively encourage racial discrimination. In light of the various possibilities for discriminatory state action, the Supreme Court has observed
that it is necessary "for a court to assess the potential impact of official
action in determining whether [a] State has significantly involved itself
with invidious discrimination."2
However, Justice Black, speaking for the majority in Palmer, found
no action by the Jackson city officials which would effectively "en18. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private restaurant
leased space in a state owned building); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.
1956) (lease of courthouse cafeteria to a tenant who excluded Negroes.) See Pennsylvania v.
Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957), where an individual left funds in
trust for a school for white orphan males. Because the city was named as trustee and was
held to be an agency of the state, the school's discrimination constituted illegal state action.
See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), where the Court held that the placing of
state facilities which render municipal service in the hands of private trustees was
discrimination by the state.
19. Palmer v. Thompson, 91. S. Ct. 1940, 1944 (1971).
20. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (1964).
22. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
23. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
24. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964);
Harem v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd, 379
U.S. 19 (1964).
25. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1962); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1962).
26. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967).
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courage" racial discrimination. Justice Black stated that he could find
nothing in the record indicating that there was a conspiracy between the
city and the YMCA to further segregation. Curiously, he added that the
court might have found such encouragement if the YMCA had been
joined as a defendant. Nevertheless, the Court failed to see the potential
impact of the city's action as encouraging racial discrimination.
The petitioners had also contended that the official reasons given for
closing the pools, citizen safety and economic necessity, could not excuse
the city's unconstitutional actions. Previously, federal courts had held
that neither of these reasons could excuse an otherwise unconstitutional
action. In Cooper v. Aaron,28 the Court declared that basic constitutional
rights were not to be sacrificed in the face of possible public disorder.
The Court thus refused to halt court-ordered desegregation of the Little
Rock, Arkansas, school system, even though federal troops had to be
called in to carry out the order in the face of mob violence."
When the City of Memphis attempted to delay segregation of its
parks for similar reasons, the courts again denied relief.8 ° The city argued
that immediate integration would require a closing of the park since the
city could not afford the extra personnel which would be required to
maintain order in an integrated park. In dismissing this argument, the
Supreme Court stated, "it is obvious that vindication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less
expensive to deny than to afford them."'"
In distinguishing Palmer from its holdings in Cooper and Watson,
the Supreme Court stated that the latter cases were applicable only in
situations where constitutional rights have been violated. The majority
opinion flatly stated that there was nothing in the fourteenth amendment
or in previous decisions which held that closing swimming pools to all
the people was a denial of equal protection of the law."2
Palmer, though its majority opinion was brief, could have farreaching effects since the Court has seemingly adopted a very narrow
view of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under
Palmer, it would appear that unless a particular action is outwardly discriminatory on its face, it is constitutionally acceptable. The dissenters in
Palmer disagree with such a narrow view and maintain that the Court
should determine whether the ultimate effect of such actions is to deprive
one group of people equal opportunity or facilities.
In the writer's opinion, this decision could lead to unfortunate
27. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1944 (1971).
28. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
29. See also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963), where the Court reversed breach of
the peace convictions of a number of Blacks after they were arrested for playing basketball
in a park customarily used only by whites. The Court held that Georgia's fear of possible
disorder resulting from petitioners continued presence in the park could not justify the
unconstitutional application of the criminal statute.
30. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
31. Id. at 537. Accord, St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956).
32. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1945 (1971).
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abuses. By holding that a city may close its recreational facilities rather
than integrate them, the Court has given local governments a new "legal"
method of avoiding desegregation. Unfortunately, the majority of the
Court chose not to consider the ultimate effect of Jackson's actions to the
black community. Because of lower economic standing, it is unlikely that
Blacks would be able to afford membership fees at privately-owned pools
(assuming they are even admitted). Particularly disturbing is the fact
that this decision was rendered in favor of a city which has been known
for its resistance to the integration of any public facility. Under the
rationale of Palmer, members of minority groups may think twice before
attempting to force a local government to desegregate recreational facilities or programs since the response of the city fathers could be to
simply close the facilities and lay the blame on excessive operational costs
and danger.8 4 In such a situation, there are certainly no winners-only
losers.
MICHAEL A. ROSEN

UNANIMITY IN CRIMINAL JURY VERDICTS:
ANTIQUITY OR NECESSITY?
Defendant, on trial for commission of a felony, was convicted in an
Oregon trial court by a jury verdict with only ten of the twelve jurors
concurring. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Oregon,' held, affirmed:
Defendant's constitutional rights as applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment were not violated by a conviction based on a less
than unanimous jury verdict. State v. Apodaca, 1 Or. App. 483, 462 P.2d
691 (1969). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
October, 1970,2 and Apodaca, along with the companion case of Johnson
v. Louisiana,' was reargued on January 10, 1972.1
33. See, e.g., United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 5-6 (5th Cir. 1963), where
the court took "judicial notice that the State of Mississippi has a steel-hard, inflexible, undeviating official policy of segregation. The policy is stated in its laws. It is rooted in custom."
(citations omitted).
34. It is important to note that the only recreational facilities closed were the pools,
and these were closed only after extended litigation. See note 1 supra. City parks, golf courses
and the zoo remained open. Evidently, only at the swimming pools would disorder and
economic loss occur.
1. The Court of Appeals of Oregon en bane decided State v. Apodaca along with three
companion cases: State v. Plumes; State v. Madden; and State v. Cooper; all reported at
1 Or. App. 483, 462 P.2d 691 (1969). The unanimous jury verdict was the sole question on
appeal in all four cases.
2. Apodaca v. Oregon, cert. granted, 400 U.S. 901 (1970) [hereinafter cited in text as
Apodaca].
3. Johnson v. Louisiana, prob. juris, noted, 400 U.S. 900 (1970). This case deals with
a nine-three criminal conviction for armed robbery. For the lower court opinion, see State
v. Johnson, 255 La. 314, 230 So.2d 825 (1970).
4. See 40 U.S.L.W. 3331 (January 10, 1972). [At the time of publication, the Court
affirmed the holding in Apodaca. See 40 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. filed May 22, 1972).]

